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Politics of Accommodation of the Rise
of China: the case of Australia
BAOGANG HE*
In the context of the rise of China, Southeast Asian countries and Australia have begun
shifting towards an accommodation policy. Robert Ross examines the accommodation policy
in South Korea, Mochizuki discusses Japanese accommodationists, and Manicom and O’Neil
show some evidence of Australian accommodation of Chinese strategic preferences. The
scholarship has, however, narrowly focused on and overestimated the role of security.
Through a study of the origin, process, structural conditions and impacts of accommodation
policy, this paper broadens the concept of accommodation to capture its multiple meanings
and practices. It finds that a selective accommodation policy and strategy toward the rise of
China developed in Australia is a sign of the changing power relations under which the
mainstream paradigms of containment and engagement, hard balancing or bandwagoning,
have proved inadequate to the task of dealing with China, and that economic interdependence
has driven the politics of accommodation in Australia and several Asian countries.
Over the course of just a few decades, China has progressed from being a relatively
marginal member of the international community to being a key participant in
economic, political and security issues at both regional and global levels.1 A rising
China has created a mishmash of opportunity, uncertainty and risk for secondary
states that have, in turn, adopted mixed strategies of balancing, engagement, hedging
and accommodation in the Asia–Pacific region. The pace and nature of China’s
ongoing ascendancy also generate serious US anxiety about China as a potential rival,
and in Australia there are concerns about being caught between the US and China.
Scholars and policymakers have discussed a variety of measures to deal with the
‘rise’ of China including containment, engagement, ‘congagement’,2 hedging strategy,3
* Baogang He is a professor and chair in International Studies at Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. The
author would like to thank Kingsley Edney and Matthew Hood for their wonderful research assistance, and valuable
comments by Andrew O’Neil, Richard Rigby, Colin Mackerras and the participants at the workshop on the rise of
China on 5 July 2010, Deakin University. He can be reached by email at baogang.he@deakin.edu.au.
1. See Mark Beeson and Fujian Li, ‘Charmed or alarmed? Reading China’s regional relations’, Journal of
Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 35–52; and James Reilly, ‘A norm-taker or a norm-maker? China’s ODA in
Southeast Asia’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 71–92.
2. David Shambaugh, ‘Containment or engagement of China? Calculating Beijing’s response’, International
Security 21(2), (1996), pp. 180–209; and Gerald Segal, ‘East Asia and the “constrainment” of China’, International
Security 20(4), (1996), pp. 107–135.
3. Evan S. Medeiros, ‘Strategic hedging and the future of Asia–Pacific stability’, Washington Quarterly 29(1),
(2005), pp. 145–167.
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integration4 and accommodation. Policymakers and scholars often consider China in
the light of power transition theory, which predicts that the conflict between great
powers is inevitable.5 Mearsheimer asserts that it is better that the US ‘go to
considerable lengths to slow down Chinese economic growth’; and that American
security competition with a rising China will intensify irrespective of its engagement
policies.6
The late Gerald Segal, however, argued that the concepts of engagement and
containment are outdated leftovers from the Cold War and should be abandoned in
favour of the concept of ‘constrainment’. Engagement is usually based on the liberal
premise that the benefits of economic interdependence act to deter destabilizing
behaviour, while containment is based on the idea that China’s rise is upsetting the
balance of power in East Asia and must therefore be restricted.7
Nowadays, policymakers talk more often about ‘hedging’ rather than ‘contain-
ment’. The term ‘hedge’ seems to be much less hawkish or stinging than the term
‘containment’. At the same time ‘accommodation’ has also been more frequently
used. Scholarship on the new development of accommodation in East Asia, such as
Robert Ross’s examination of policy in South Korea8 and Mochizuki’s discussion of
Japanese policy,9 are testament to its emergence. Manicom and O’Neil also show
some evidence of it in the Australian context, although the Australian alignment with
the US is still strong.10
The process of accommodation is a multiple-level and mutual-influencing process,
starting from small power to middle power (or ‘secondary state’) and moving
eventually to influence great-power policy. Small powers in Asia have taken a
leading role in making necessary adjustments to accommodate the rise of China.
Thailand,11 South Korea, Malaysia, and Australia have shifted towards an accom-
modation policy concerning China. Each nation comes to terms with China in its own
manner combining the different elements of containment, engagement and hedging
strategies in a variety of ways.
This paper aims to study the origin, process, structural conditions and impact of
accommodation policy, broaden the concept of accommodation itself, and explain
accommodation in its own right. To elucidate accommodation policy and strategy, this
paper examines several independent variables, including power relations, economic
interdependence, and domestic interests and politics. The paper begins with a brief
literature survey on diverse strategies and responses to the rise of China, followed by a
4. Dennis C. Blair, Carla A. Hills and Frank Sampson Jannuzi, US–China Relations: An Affirmative Agenda,
A Responsible Course: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 2007).
5. Richard Rosecrance, ‘Power and international relations: the rise of China and its effects’, International
Studies Perspectives 7(1), (2006), pp. 31–35; Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, China’s Ascent: Power, Security, and the
Future of International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008).
6. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).
7. Segal, ‘East Asia and the “constrainment” of China’.
8. R. S. Ross, ‘Balance of power politics and the rise of China: accommodation and balancing in East Asia’,
Security Studies 15(3), (2006), pp. 355–395.
9. Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s shifting strategy toward the rise of China’, The Journal of Strategic Studies
30(4–5), (2007), pp. 739–776.
10. James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, ‘Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual?: Australian’s
response to a rising China’, The Pacific Review 23(1), (2010), pp. 23–44.
11. Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘China no 1 in Thai foreign policy?’, The Nation, (24 June 1998), p. A4.
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discussion of the concept of accommodation. It then examines the four primary sources
of accommodation, and then assesses the politics of Australian accommodation under
the government of Howard and Rudd (it focuses on Rudd as Prime Minister not Foreign
Minister under the Gillard government in 2010). The conclusion explores the question
of whether, or under what conditions, accommodation can ease the frequency and
intensity of conflicts between the great powers.
It should be acknowledged at the beginning that the accommodation process is not
linear. Often there are backlashes and retreats. A series of political events in 2009, for
example, seemed to disrupt the accommodation process. Overall, from a long-term
perspective it is clear that there is a trend of incremental changes towards more
accommodation in Australia. Of course, Australia has also pursued soft balancing in
the security area. I will not, however, discuss this in this paper as McDougall and
Nick Bisley examine soft balance and regional security architecture, respectively.12
Turn to accommodation
In analyzing the responses by secondary states within the Asia–Pacific region to
China’s rise, most scholars agree that the standard realist options of either hard
balancing against or bandwagoning with the rising power are too limited to account
accurately for the variety of state behaviour that can be observed.13 Even Ross,
who makes use of a relatively strict dichotomy when assessing secondary-state
responses to China’s rise, abandons bandwagoning in favour of the more flexible
term ‘accommodating’. This is because bandwagoning implies a capitulation that
is too absolute to be found in any but the weakest states’ responses to rising
powers, whereas accommodation can involve a more gradual and nuanced shift in
alignment.14
Ross’s account of secondary-state responses to China was deeply linked to realist
discussions about great-power politics. According to Ross, if a secondary state is
willing to stand up to a rising power on issues of war and peace, then this
demonstrates alignment with another great power, and is therefore a reflection of
balancing behaviour. If the secondary state compromises with the rising power on
such issues, however, and does not seek to deepen its alignment with the status quo
power then this reflects accommodation.15 For Ross, social factors such as intentions
and perceptions of intentions are not relevant, except that the growth of a rising
power’s ‘soft power’ in a secondary state may indicate the likelihood of an emerging
accommodationist strategy there, while an erosion of the rising power’s soft power
may indicate a tendency towards balancing on the part of the secondary state.16
12. Derek McDougall, ‘Responses to “rising China” in the East Asian region: soft balancing with
accommodation’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 1–18; and Nick Bisley, ‘China’s rise and
the making of East Asia’s security architecture’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(73), (2012), pp. 19–34.
13. Amitav Acharya, ‘Will Asia’s past be its future?’, International Security 28(3), (2003/04); David C. Kang,
China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Kuik Cheng-
Chwee, ‘The essence of hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s response to a rising China’, Contemporary Southeast
Asia 30(2), (2008); Gilbert Rozman, ‘South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power’s options within the
East Asian core triangle’, The Pacific Review 20(2), (2007).
14. Ross, ‘Balance of power politics and the rise of China’.
15. Ibid., pp. 367–368.
16. Ibid., p. 368.
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Other scholars argue that secondary states in Asia are taking a mixed approach to
China’s rise, using terms such as accommodation, hedging and engagement to
describe the complex middle ground between the extremes of all-out balancing and
bandwagoning.17 Some researchers, such as Kang and Kuik, devise a framework for
analysis that places balancing and bandwagoning at each end and then attempt to
categorize the various policy responses to a rising power that lie between the two
extremes. For Kang, ‘accommodation’ lies close to the bandwagoning end of the
spectrum, while ‘hedging’ is closer to the balancing end.18 Kang differentiates
between the two strategies of hedging and accommodation by referring to the level of
fear felt towards the rising power, with a higher level of fear or distrust leading to
sceptical hedging and low or no substantial fear leading to accommodation.19
For Kuik, the choice between balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning is based on
the risks associated with the great power. If there is a clear and imminent threat then
balancing is pursued, if the great power is a source of aid then bandwagoning is
pursued, but if the risks are uncertain—as in the case of the post-Cold War Asia–
Pacific region—then hedging is the most likely outcome.20 Yet this hedging, which
combines military and non-military policies and has ‘a particular reliance on
multilateral institutions’, will only occur in situations where there is no immediate
threat, no rigid ideological fault lines between different camps, and no full-blown
great-power rivalry.21
The above writings offer us a valuable conceptual framework and useful insight.
There are, however, three serious problems. First, while it is critical to study the
implication of a rising China on strategic and security issues, scholarship has
narrowly focused on and overestimated the role of security. Ross, Kang and Kuik all
discuss the security implications of a rising China and use terms such as war and
peace, fear and risk. The preoccupation over security concerns blinds us to other
factors that play important roles in the politics of accommodation. Accommodation is
a multidimensional phenomenon involving many aspects and factors. Questions
concerning realignment, such as those that posit Australia being dragged into the
Chinese orbit, are premature, unrealistic and infeasible. Anyone who knows
Australia’s history, culture and political system will regard such questions at best as
hypothetical. The predication that Australia will have a hard choice between
Washington and Beijing fails. There is increasing mutual accommodation and
cooperation. We first have to fully understand the politics of accommodation before
we answer big questions about ‘hard choice’, ‘realignment’ and ‘China’s orbit’.
Second, Ross argues that economic dependence of a secondary state on a rising
power is not by itself sufficient to compel accommodating behaviour—there must be
a military threat.22 Contrary to this, however, economic interdependence has driven
the politics of accommodation in Australia and several Asian countries, and the effect
of economic engagement has already been felt in the security sphere. The current
17. For example, Kang, China Rising; Kuik, ‘The essence of hedging’; Denny Roy, ‘Southeast Asia and China:
balancing or bandwagoning?’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 27(2), (2005).
18. Kang, China Rising, p. 53.
19. Ibid., p. 53.
20. Kuik, ‘The Essence of hedging’, p. 164.
21. Ibid., p. 165, p. 179.
22. Ross, ‘Balance of power politics and the rise of China’, p. 366.
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system of globalized capitalism and its associated economic interdependence,23
and extensive institutionalization of the regional order, all make a zero-sum choice
simplistic and compel the logic of mutual accommodation.
Third, there are varied descriptions using different terms to conceptualize the
behaviour of the same country. For example, in 2005 Roy described Malaysia’s
response to China’s rise as a hedging strategy, in 2007 Kang portrayed Malaysia as
accommodating China’s rise, and in 2008 Kuik depicted Malaysia as embracing
the hedging strategies of ‘limited-bandwagoning’ and ‘binding-engagement’.24 Goh
notes that the disagreement reflects differing definitions of balancing and
bandwagoning, and whether analysts place greater weight on military links with
the US or economic and political links with China.25
Manicom and O’Neil have called for ‘greater theoretical sophistication and
nuance’.26 Following this call, this paper argues that the concept of accommodation
needs to be broadened to capture its multiple meanings and practices.
Accommodation takes place in many areas involving a wide range of issues. We
need to distinguish different types of accommodation from symbolic to substantive,
selective, equal, institutional and ideological; we also need to examine the mixed
strategies of accommodation with hedging and how existing or new regional
institutions inhibit or facilitate the accommodation of the rising power.
Accommodation has very broad connotations including not only contact and
engagement, but also recognition of and adjustment to the needs of others. It denotes
such things as ‘to extend kindness’, ‘to provide space’, ‘to bring into harmony’ and
‘to reconcile differences’. It can be disaggregated into opinion, policy and strategy
ranging from moderate to extreme variants.
Accommodation can be located in the middle ground between the extremes of
balancing and bandwagoning, taking varied forms at different levels with regards to
different issues. Following this it overlaps with engagement policy. Engagement is the
politically acceptable term for politicians by both main parties in Australia. It is a major
trend in Australian policy towards China. Nevertheless, it disguises ‘accommodation’.
By contrast, the term accommodation reflects the new reality of politics in which it is
the first time in Australian history that Australia has had to deal with greater Chinese
influence. Ross notes that engagement includes accommodation in the sense that
‘engagement requires acknowledging Chinese interests and negotiating solutions that
accommodate both American and Chinese objectives’.27 At the same time, Ross
distinguishes the accommodation policy in South Korea and Taiwan from the
engagement and balancing policy in Japan.28 In a similar vein, Mochizuki makes a
23. Chinese businesses are embedded in global and regional production networks. Chengxin Pan, ‘What is
Chinese about Chinese business? Locating the “rise of China” in global production networks’, Journal of
Contemporary China 18(58), (2009), pp. 7–25.
24. Roy, ‘Southeast Asia and China’, p. 315; Kang, China Rising, pp. 54–55; Kuik, ‘The essence of hedging’,
p. 172.
25. Evelyn Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia: analyzing regional security strategies’,
International Security 32(3), (2007/08), pp. 117–118.
26. Manicom and O’Neil, ‘Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual?’, p. 40. In this regards, Kuik
develops five categories: two risk-contingency options and three return-maximizing options.
27. Ross, ‘Balance of power politics and the rise of China’.
28. Robert S. Ross, ‘Beijing as a conservative power’, in Foreign Affairs, ed., The Rise of China (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), p. 25.
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distinction between accommodation and cooperative engagement in that Japanese
accommodationists see that ‘hedging against the rise of China through a tightened
US–Japan alliance could jeopardize the prospects for Sino-Japanese cooperation’.29
It is a mistake to confuse accommodation with appeasement. The actions and
policies of unprincipled and comprehensive compromise, such as accepting imposed
conditions so as to give in to the demands of an aggressor, is appeasement. The
Australian accommodation of China is not submissive and unprincipled, rather it is
selective—it is strategically selective in that it accommodates some demands but
refuses others as shown in next three sections. Australia has continued cooperation
with China on a number of issues, while strengthening its alignment with the United
States in the security realm.
Sources and determinants of accommodation
Scholars highlight different factors as being the important drivers of accommodation,
balancing or hedging policies. For Ross, vulnerability to China’s military power is a
primary consideration that determines whether a secondary state will move towards
balancing or accommodation.30 Kang, however, argues that behaviour is driven by a
combination of both interests and identities acting as ‘key variables in determining
threat and stability in international relations’.31 Rozman also highlights the role of
identities in shaping security assessments of China’s rise in South Korea. He argues
that pursuing balancing policies ‘would be tantamount to conceding that the Cold
War continues in Asia’ and that ‘pursuing a path of bandwagoning with China would
accept a Sinocentric order’.32 Other scholars, however, consider the economic
opportunities of China’s rise to be a factor in shaping policy responses. Below, I select
and examine four factors to explain Australian accommodation.
First, the rise of China is the primary source of the changing power relations
which make accommodation inevitable. A middle power such as Australia follows the
ASEAN example and has been obliged to take a step toward accommodating China’s
ascendancy. Hugh White has articulated well the power transformation which
underpins the politics of accommodation.33 Historically, Australia was a British
colony, and was under the influence of Britain for a long time. During and after the
Second World War it then moved into the orbit of American influence; however, it
has not had any historical experience of facing Chinese influence. In contrast, Japan,
South Korea and Vietnam all have such rich historical experience. Despite that,
Australia can live with, and deal with, a strong China effectively through a series of
innovative accommodation policies.
Accommodation must be reciprocal. If China had adopted an aggressive stance or
action against any Southeast Asian country or even Taiwan, it certainly would have
fundamentally redefined the characteristics of accommodation politics by inviting
29. Mochizuki, ‘Japan’s shifting strategy toward the rise of China’, p. 766.
30. Ross, ‘Balance of power politics and the rise of China’.
31. Kang, China Rising, p. 9.
32. Rozman, ‘South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry’, p. 200.
33. Hugh White, ‘The limits to optimism: Australia and the rise of China’, Australian Journal of International
Affairs 59(4), (2005), pp. 469–480.
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criticism, protest and hawkish reaction. Indeed, when China carried out a missile test
in space in January 2007, Australia showed a much stronger reaction than that of the
US and Japan in that the Chinese ambassador to Australia was called in to explain
China’s intentions. When Beijing maintained a tough and rigid policy toward Tibet,
even France and Germany confronted Chinese leaders at the risk of losing their
business opportunities in 2008. In the process of adopting its own accommodation
policy, China is taking a moderate and piece-meal approach. This sets a precedent for
reciprocal accommodation. The doctrine of a peaceful rise can be seen as China’s
attempt to accommodate the West, in particular the US. It is even interpreted as a new
international contract between Beijing and transnational actors, whereby Beijing
promises to be responsible and peaceful.34
There is a difference between the idea of accommodation as an inevitable result of
shifts in power, and the multiple ways in which accommodation can proceed in
practice. Accommodation is contingent on multiple factors other than just power shifts.
While accommodation might be inevitable in the long term, there are many different
ways that this process can occur in the short term, some smoother and more desirable
than others, and this is affected not just by power relations but by other factors, such as
institutions or domestic politics. In other words, the question is not so much whether
accommodation will occur, but rather how it will occur. This distinction means that the
first determinant of accommodation—the rise of China—is important for figuring out
whether accommodation will occur, but the following three determinants—economic
relations, domestic politics and great-power relations—might help to figure out how
it will occur.
Second, Australian accommodation is largely economy-induced rather than
security-induced. Sino-Australian economic interdependence has a spillover effect
on security issues. It seems that the Australian vulnerability to China’s military power
pointed out by Ross is not a primary consideration for Canberra. Unlike Japan and
Vietnam, who face territorial disputes with China, Australia has no territorial quarrels
with China and is geographically remote. China’s threat is not an issue for Australia
at all. No one thinks that China will invade Australia although Australia must prepare
to be involved in US military action against China over the Taiwan issue.35
The immediate imperative of Australian accommodation is the economic
interdependence between China and Australia. China’s massive purchases of raw
materials are driving the boom in Australia’s economy and are widely acknowledged
as having helped finance the Howard government’s income tax cuts in the 2006
federal budget.36 Needless to say, China has overtaken Japan to become Australia’s
number one trading partner.
While the success of the Australian economy in avoiding recession through the
Global Financial Crisis owes much to government policy and action as well as
34. Chengxin Pan, ‘“Peaceful rise” and China’s new international contract: the state in change in transnational
society’, in Linda Chelan Li, ed., Chinese State in Transition: Processes and Contests in Local China (London:
Routledge, 2009), pp. 127–144.
35. Of course, no one thinks that China will invade the US either and they have no territorial disputes; however, a
great power defines its security interests as being broader than a middle power does, and therefore the USA sees China
posing more threats potentially to its national interests.
36. Paul Kelly, ‘Costello’s golden egg’, The Weekend Australian, (13–14 May 2006), Inquirer: pp. 21–28;
Glenda Korporaal, ‘Riding China boom sets us up for tax cuts’, The Australian, (11 May 2005), p. 9.
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previously existent financial regulation, this economic stability has also been heavily
based on massively increased trade with China. Already a major consumer of
Australian iron ore, the trade agreements for the provision of US$50 billion worth of
liquefied natural gas to China from various Australian LNG reserves represents the
biggest trade deal in Australia’s history.37 These enormous investments in Australia’s
economy have enabled Australia to steer clear of recession and elevated China to
Australia’s most important trading partner. No Australian government is going to
renege on the most important contract the nation’s economy has ever witnessed. While
Australian governments during the 1980s and early 1990s felt reasonably free to
criticize China, the growing trade relationship between the two countries has coincided
with a tendency towards reticence on the part of Australian government officials to
express overt criticism of China, and particularly of China’s approach to human rights.
Scholars have different opinions on the effect of economic interdependence. Yahuda
points out, ‘[n]otwithstanding the close and significant economic interdependence
between China and Japan, there is no corresponding spillover into social, intellectual, or
security engagement’.38 Segal argues that economic interdependence is inadequate by
itself to provide security for the ASEAN states against China’s rising power. For Segal,
the response by the secondary states of ASEAN to China’s rise in the mid-1990s was an
uncritical economic engagement that placed too much reliance on interdependence and
eventually ran into problems when disputes arose over territory in the South China
Sea.39 One might also argue that there are trade-offs between Australian economic and
security calculations. Australian economic benefits from China might weaken and even
result in the elimination of its security arrangement with the US in the long term.
Nevertheless, economic interdependence between China and Australia is inclusive
and mutual; they are different from the economically separated relations between the
Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War. Sino-Australian economic relations
have spillover effects in security cooperation. While both the Labor and Coalition
governments have been firmly committed to maintaining the alliance with the US,
there seems to be a trend in Canberra to move to a neutral position with regards to
China’s security concern and refrain from security dialogues with the US. Australia
has not opposed China on issues such as Taiwan and has ceased to pursue policies
that China might perceive as threatening its strategic interests. Manicom and O’Neil
correctly observe that ‘there are some indications that Australia has, since this time
[the late 1990s], accommodated some of China’s strategic preferences in the
region’.40 Hugh White argues that ‘a major expansion of China’s air and naval power
is a natural and maybe inevitable consequence of China’s economic growth’. He
acknowledges the legitimacy of China’s role as a major power—including a major
military power—in the ‘Asian Century’.41
37. See http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/company-news-story.aspx?storyid¼200908180615dowjonesdjonline
000109 (accessed 9 June 2010).
38. Michael Yahuda, ‘The limits of economic interdependence: Sino-Japanese relations’, in Alastair Iain Johnson
and Robert S. Ross, eds, New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2006), p. 181.
39. Segal, ‘East Asia and the “constrainment” of China’.
40. Manicom and O’Neil, ‘Accommodation, realignment, or business as usual?’, p. 34.
41. Hugh White, Learning to Live with a Stronger China, available at: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/
02/Learning-to-live-with-a-strongr-China.aspx (accessed 31 December 2009).
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Increasing economic interdependence often overrides conflict logic, undercuts
power rival theory, and reinforces the necessity of international cooperation. The
necessity for international cooperation requires the blurring or abandoning of the
clear friend and enemy line which underlies traditional security politics.
Economic interdependence has also constrained China’s aggressive behaviour
toward Taiwan. When China launched missile testing in 1995–1996, coastal provinces
suffered economically and they demanded that the central government ease the tension
across the Taiwan Straits.
Third, domestic politics plays an important role in facilitating or constraining
accommodation policy. Ross downplays domestic politics in international relations of
power. In contrast, Kuik argues that the hedging behaviour of Singapore and Malaysia
in response to China’s rise is not driven by the power dynamics of the international
system, but rather the need for domestic regime legitimation at home.42 In Australia,
domestic factors such as the opposition party, Green Party, and NGOs such as Amnesty
International and the Australia Tibet Council, all substantively constrained Rudd’s
move toward accommodation. It was difficult for Rudd to adopt an accommodation
policy publicly so he returned to an engagement language that treats China more
cautiously. Rudd was portrayed in the media as being pro-China. Greg Sheridan
lambasted Rudd for being too soft in his approach, repeatedly referring to Rudd’s
‘appeasement’ of Beijing.43 To counter the pro-China image, Rudd had to distance
himself from policies that might be perceived as being too favourable to China.
The federal opposition heavily used, or attempted to use, anti-Chinese sentiment,
or at least suspicion, to launch criticism of the Labor government for alleged softness
in their dealings with China. Former opposition leader, Malcolm Turnbull, argued
that Rudd had not been a strong enough voice for Australia in the two countries’
dealings, and even went as far as to refer to Rudd as a ‘roving ambassador for the
People’s Republic of China’.44
In addition, Chinese domestic politics has also driven changes in the relationship.
In 2008–2009, China’s suppressive polices toward minorities and dissidents slowed
down the pace of accommodation. The Australian government does not have any
moral grounds to offer open accommodation in the eyes of the Australian public.
Only a more open, democratic China will assist the Australian government in selling
its accommodation policy to its people.
Fourth, the improvement in Sino-US relations set up the preconditions which made
Australian accommodation of China possible and served to further develop
Australia’s accommodation policies. The key to avoiding the unwelcome emergence
of a great-power rival lies in the mutual accommodation between the US and China.
Aside from trade conflicts, the deepening economic interdependence between the US
42. Kuik, ‘The essence of hedging’, p. 161.
43. Greg Sheridan, ‘Rudd’s approach to China and Stern Hu, a lesson in cowardice’, The Australian, (20 March
2010), available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/rudds-approach-to-china-and-stern-hu-a-lesson-
in-cowardice/story-e6frg6zo-1225842986389 (accessed 29 March 2010); Greg Sheridan, ‘China sends a message,
and we tremble and obey’, The Australian, (25 March 2010), available at: http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/
opinion/china-sends-a-message-and-we-tremble-and-obey/story-e6frg6zo-1225844947350 (accessed 29 March
2010).
44. Rob Taylor, ‘Anti-China tensions on the rise in Australia’, Reuters, (29 March 2009), available at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/idUSSYD42089420090330 (accessed 29 March 2010).
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and China, their overlapping security interests and concerns, or what Taylor calls ‘a
prolongation of the post-11 September honeymoon’,45 the absence of new military
alliances driven by Beijing, and the overall improving relations all make ‘inclusive
choice’ possible, meaning that secondary states are able to cooperate with both rising
and status quo powers. Canberra does not want to directly take sides in the way that a
more simplistic interpretation of the bandwagoning and balancing dichotomy might
imply. Former Prime Minister John Howard, and then Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer, insisted that Australia would not be forced to choose between the US and
China, because escalating strategic competition between them was not inevitable.
In addition, most Southeast and East Asian countries, including Australia, engage
with China economically and politically while continuing to support US security
arrangements in the region. Southeast and East Asian countries attempt to balance the
US and China. They do not want to make a choice between the US, Japan and China.
In a similar vein, Canberra has convincingly demonstrated that, in the absence of
crisis over Taiwan, it does not need to choose between Washington and Beijing. Both
the Howard and Rudd governments skilfully manoeuvred between American
predominance and growing Chinese ascendancy. On the security front, the US–
Australia alliance remains firm. On market issues, however, Sino-Australian relations
have been developed further. Such policy can stabilize the region and contain
potential conflicts. This is the basis for mutual accommodation being the preferred
option while undermining the reason for a zero-sum conflict.
Accommodation under the Howard government
Sino-Australian relations have gone through a series of transitions. Before 1949
there was a low level of contact, although an Australian ambassador was posted to
Chongqing in July 1941.46 There were hostile relations from 1949 until 1972, as
Australia fought in the Korean War against Chinese forces and the Liberal–Country
Party Coalition stoked anti-communist sentiment at home.47 The Tibetan uprising in
1959, war with India in 1962, China’s successful nuclear test in 1964, and turmoil in
Indochina all fed Australian perceptions of a Chinese communist threat, while the
alliance with the US prevented any unilateral moves toward diplomatic recognition
of Beijing.48 Relations were generally cordial between 1972, when Whitlam’s Labor
government first established diplomatic relations with the PRC, and 1989, with Kent
referring to this time as one when ‘fear gave way to enthusiastic friendship’.49 During
this period all Australian prime ministers visited China, and CCP General Secretary
Hu Yaobang and Premier Zhao Ziyang also visited Australia in 1983.50 After the
45. Brendan Taylor, ‘US–China relations after 11 September: a long engagement or marriage of convenience?’,
Australian Journal of International Affairs 59(2), (2005), pp. 179–199.
46. Edmund S. K. Fung and Colin Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship: Australia’s Policies towards the People’s
Republic of China, 1966–1982 (St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1985), p. 17.
47. Colin Mackerras, ‘The Australia–China relationship: a partnership of equals?’, in Nicholas Thomas, ed.,
Re-orienting Australia–China Relations: 1972 to the Present (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 16–17.
48. Fung and Mackerras, From Fear to Friendship, pp. 23–31.
49. Ann Kent, ‘Australia–China relations, 1966–1996: a critical overview’, The Australian Journal of Politics
and History 42(3), (1996), p. 367.
50. Ibid., p. 368.
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1989 Tiananmen Incident, the Australian government imposed sanctions against
China, but one year later Canberra pledged to further cooperative relations. By 1991,
all sanctions and restrictions except in the military domain were cancelled.51 In the
early 1990s, there was strong enthusiasm in Australia for the potential benefits of
economic complementarity with China.52
In the early years of the Howard government, Canberra took issue with China on a
number of topics, including the one-child policy, religious freedom and human rights
in Tibet. 1996 was a very controversial year, with the Australian government
protesting against China’s nuclear weapon tests and China’s missile exercise in the
Taiwan Strait.53 The Howard government expressed its support for the US position
on the missile exercise through a public statement, the strongest support expressed for
the US position of any government in the region.54 In June 1996, Canberra cancelled
the Development Import Finance Facility and the Australian China Relations Report
by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee was tabled.55 In August 1996, Australia’s
negotiations with Taiwan over the sale of uranium received a very negative response
in Beijing, while in September then Deputy Prime Minister Jim Anderson’s visit to
Taiwan as leader of an Australia–Taiwan business delegation led to further
friction.56 During that month, both Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister
Downer met with the Dalai Lama, provoking condemnation from the Chinese side.57
Pauline Hanson made a speech against Asian immigrants and anti-Chinese incidents
took place in major cities in Australia.58
In the latter part of 1996, the APEC meeting in Manila was a crucial turning point
towards a more positive relationship with China. Howard pledged to commence a
process whereby differences in political systems and standpoints on certain issues
should not be allowed to obstruct the relationship, and political relations developed on
a rational and pragmatic basis.59 Visits of Howard to China in 1997 and Jiang Zemin to
Australia in 1999 were accompanied by an improvement in the security relationship
between the two countries. Minister of National Defence Chi Haotian came to
Australia in early 1998, a few months later three Chinese naval vessels docked in
Sydney, and the following year the Australian Defence Minister visited the PRC.60
51. Ann Kent, ‘Human rights: from sanctions to delegations to dialogue’, in Thomas, ed., Re-orienting Australia–
China Relations, p. 149.
52. Kent, ‘Australia–China relations, 1966–1996’, p. 370.
53. Ibid., pp. 374, 378.
54. Mackerras, ‘The Australia–China relationship’, p. 23.
55. Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade, Media Release Joint
Statement: 1996–97 Budget: Foreign Affairs and Trade Portfolio, (20 August 1996), available at: http://
foreignminister.gov.au/releases/1996/fa81.html (accessed 6 April 2010); Defence and Trade References Committee,
Australian Parliament Senate Foreign Affairs, Australia China Relations: Report of the Senate Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade References Committee (Canberra: Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1996).
56. Stephen Sherlock, ‘Australia’s relations with China: what’s the problem?’, Parliament of Australia
Parliamentary Library Current Issues Brief 23, (21 February 1997), available at: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/
Pubs/CIB/1996-97/97cib23.htm (accessed 12 April 2010).
57. Mackerras, ‘The Australia–China relationship’, p. 24.
58. Michael Leach, Geoffrey Stokes and Ian Ward, eds, The Rise and Fall of One Nation (St Lucia, Queensland:
University of Queensland Press, 2000).
59. Jia Qingguo and Hou Yingli, ‘Zouxiang pingdeng huli: Lengzhan jeishu yilai de Zhong-Ao guanxi’ [‘Towards
equality and mutual benefit: China–Australia relations since the end of the Cold War’], Guoji Luntan [International
Forum ] no. 4, (1999).
60. Mackerras, ‘The Australia–China relationship’, p. 21.
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Howard’s approach to China was based on what he called ‘positive realism’—
relying on mutual respect and shared interests without needing to draw on shared
cultural understanding. He saw relations with China as transactional, based on shared
interests rather than common values.61 Australia stepped back from openly
supporting US public criticism of China on human rights, supported China’s bid for
World Trade Organization membership, and did not join with US efforts to lobby the
European Union to maintain its ban on selling arms to China.62
The Howard government made a number of symbolic or even perhaps substantive
moves towards accommodating Beijing. Both the Presidents of the US and China
made state visits to Canberra in 2003, with Hu Jintao addressing the Australian
parliament the day after George W. Bush. That Hu was invited to speak to the
Australian parliament was seen as having great importance for China in that it
signified symbolic equal treatment of China and the United States by Australia.
In 2005, Australia recognized China’s market economy status while the US refused
to do so. In 2005, Howard even offered the idea that Australia could act as an
honourable broker between China and the US. Former President George W. Bush
endorsed such a role for Australia, but China has been more dismissive. He Yafei, the
then Chinese Foreign Ministry director-general for North America and Oceania has
said: ‘I don’t see any role for brokering a deal between the US and China—we are in
continuous dialogue with the US and we understand each other pretty well’.63
On the question of Taiwan, which is seen as a critical sovereignty issue by Beijing, the
Australian government responded positively to China’s calls for the United States and
other international actors to criticize the moves by then President Chen Shui-bian to assert
a more independent posture in world affairs in 2003–2004. As China wished, Australia
voted against a US-backed effort in 2004 to help Taiwan gain entry into the World Health
Organization. Australia refrained for four years from sending an Australian minister-level
official to Taiwan—something that had been an annual occurrence before.64
Throughout the 1990s the Australian response to Chinese human rights abuses
moved from applying sanctions in the wake of Tiananmen Square, to engaging in
active monitoring through human rights delegations, to eventually only applying
passive monitoring through a bilateral human rights dialogue.65 At the United
Nations, Australia, along with some European countries, accepted a Chinese offer of
engaging in a regular bilateral human rights dialogue behind closed doors in
exchange for giving up its sponsorship of the annual resolution on China’s human
rights situation at the UN Human Rights Commission.66 This transition away from
61. Michael Wesley, The Howard Paradox: Australian Diplomacy in Asia, 1996–2006 (Sydney: ABC Books,
2007), pp. 52–53.
62. Ibid., pp. 126–127.
63. Mark Metherell, ‘PM’s vision: Australia as honest broker’, The Sydney Morning Herald, (1 April 2005),
available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/National/PMs-vision-Australia-as-honest-broker/2005/03/31/
1111862537094.html (accessed 12 April 2010); Peter Hartcher and Hamish McDonald, ‘Mixed signals for
Howard on China visit’, Sydney Morning Herald, (18 April 2005), available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/
National/Mixed-signals-for-Howard-on-China-visit/2005/04/17/1113676650591.html (accessed 12 April 2010);
D. D. McNicoll, ‘Envoy dismisses Aussie broker role’, The Australian, (22 July 2005).
64. Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Inc., 2005).
65. Kent, ‘Human rights’.
66. Ibid., p. 153.
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sanctions and toward private discussion ‘had less to do with any improvement in
China’s human rights than with Australia’s adjustment to China’s rise as a global and
regional economic and political power’.67
In May–June 2005, during the process of FTA negotiations, Chen Yonglin, a
Chinese diplomat-turned asylum seeker, faced considerable difficulty in getting
refugee status. Chen claimed that officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade urged him to return to the Chinese Consulate and tried to discourage him from
applying for a protection visa by saying that the likelihood of it being granted was
‘extremely impossible’.68 It is unknown whether the impulse for this came from the
bureaucratic or ministerial quarters. At the very least, government ministers refrained
from publicly expressing concerns about Chen’s allegations of there being 1,000
Chinese agents and informers in Australia.69 In contrast, Chen was invited to
Washington to give testimony to the US Congress.70
Unlike 1996, when the Dalai Lama received an official welcome from the highest
levels of the government, during his visit to Australia in 2002 both Howard and
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer were out of the country and unable to meet with
him, and the government prevented him from delivering a planned speech at
Parliament House.71
In the area of security, the extreme version of accommodation includes the views
expressed by the former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, who argued that
Australia should re-evaluate the relevance of the ANZUS treaty in the post-Cold War
world and perhaps consider withdrawing from it to avoid being drawn by the US into
a war over Taiwan.72 In 2004, the former Foreign Minister Alexander Downer made a
statement in Beijing that downplayed the extent of the coverage of the ANZUS treaty
and implied that Australia would not automatically support a US intervention in
defence of Taiwan. His comments came after a session in the Great Hall of the People
in which Premier Wen Jiabao signalled an interest in enhancing Australia–China
dialogue on political and strategic issues.73 In a similar vein, President Roh Moo-
hyun declared in 2005 that South Korean facilities could not be used by US forces in a
Taiwan conflict. It was also argued that Japan should opt out of a Taiwan contingency.
After Downer’s statement, China further tested the waters by inquiring whether
Australia would relinquish its ANZUS security treaty with the United States if there
were a war across the Taiwan Straits. Such a move would break down the traditional
alliance and existing security arrangements. Under American pressure, and motivated
by the government’s own commitment to the US alliance, John Howard moved to
reverse the effects of Downer’s statement by reaffirming the obligations under the
67. Ibid., p. 148.
68. Jewel Topsfield, ‘Chinese diplomat was urged not to defect’, The Age, (27 July 2005), available at: http://
www.theage.com.au/news/national/chinese-diplomat-was-urged-not-to-defect/2005/07/26/1122143849438.html
(accessed 12 April 2010).
69. Greg Sheridan, ‘Dragon’s claws’, The Weekend Australian, (11–12 June 2005).
70. Michael Gawenda and Craig Skehan, ‘Spies, lies and persecution’, The Sydney Morning Herald, (23 July
2005), available at: http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/spies-lies-and-persecution/2005/07/22/1121539154791.
html (accessed 12 April 2010).
71. Mackerras, ‘The Australia–China relationship’, p. 24.
72. Malcolm Fraser, ‘An Australian Critique’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 2, (2001),
pp. 225–34.
73. Hamish McDonald and Mark Forbes, ‘Downer flags China shift’, The Age, (18 August 2004), p. 1.
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ANZUS treaty: ‘We have to consult and come to each other’s aid when we’re under
attack or involved in conflict. That’s the situation’.74
The Trilateral Dialogue at the ministerial level among the US, Australia and Japan
was held in Sydney in 2006, when Downer made public remarks that the dialogue is
not about containing China and that China’s economic growth is a positive factor in
the region and beyond. William Tow also argues that Australia and its partners in the
upgraded US–Japan–Australia Trilateral Security Dialogue should consider ways
to make the dialogue function more as a ‘regional confidence-building mechanism
rather than as an “exclusivist” appendage of the US security alliance network’.75
On 16 January 2007, Canberra called in the Chinese Ambassador to protest against
a missile test in space. The 2007 Australian Defence White Paper expressed explicitly
the concern with China’s pace and scope of military modernization, particularly the
development of new and disruptive capabilities such as the anti-satellite (ASAT)
missile. At the same time, the Paper acknowledged that ‘China has a legitimate
interest in protecting its own security’; and that ‘Australia’s strategic engagement
with China has been limited to date, but it is growing at a pace that recognises our
substantial shared interests in regional security’.76
The Rudd government’s accommodation policy toward China
Kevin Rudd’s victory in the 2007 election generated very high expectations. Rudd’s
speech in Mandarin as opposition leader during the Sydney APEC meeting in 2007,
where he upstaged John Howard, was an important moment in building Rudd’s
credibility as a potential prime minister. It also fostered the perception that a Rudd-
led government would be well placed to manage Australia’s relations with Asia and
particularly with China.
After the election of a new Labor government later that year, Rudd became
Australia’s, and the West’s, first Mandarin-speaking leader. Rudd’s language abilities,
academic background as a student of Asian Studies (the subject of his honours thesis
was Wei Jingsheng), and time spent as a diplomat in Beijing, raised hopes that he
would be able to skilfully negotiate the challenges posed by China’s rising power. The
Rudd government’s approach to China focused not only on the bilateral relationship
but also on the two countries’ interaction in multilateral contexts, and has attempted to
broaden the relationship beyond the economic dimension.
Rudd outlined his government’s approach to foreign policy in a number of
speeches throughout 2008. This approach, according to Rudd, was based on ‘creative
middle power diplomacy’ and contained three main components: maintaining the
alliance with the US, supporting the United Nations, and actively engaging with the
Asia–Pacific region.77 Managing relations with China are a key part of this last
74. Mark Forbes, ‘Howard assures US of loyalty’, The Age, (21 August 2004).
75. William Tow, Asia–Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001).
76. See http://www.defence.gov.au/ans/2007/default.htm (accessed 10 September 2007).
77. Kevin Rudd, The Australia–US Alliance and Emerging Challenges in the Asia–Pacific Region, (Speech to
The Brookings Institution, 31 March 2008), available at: http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5877 (accessed 8 March 2010);
Kevin Rudd, Address to the RSL National Congress, (9 September 2008), available at: http://www.pm.gov.au/node/
5598 (accessed 8 March 2010).
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component. Rudd appears to see Australia as occupying a unique position among
Western countries in relation to China and Asia. In a speech to students at Peking
University in April 2008, he presented Australia as China’s ‘zhengyou’—a friend
who will give forthright admonition—and proceeded to speak plainly about human
rights problems in Tibet.78 A few months later Rudd announced that he wanted
Australia to be ‘the most Asia-literate country in the collective West’.79
In contrast to the Howard government, Rudd was more proactive in attempting to
draw China into greater multilateral engagement with the region. Rudd acknowl-
edged Beijing’s foreign policy idea of creating a ‘harmonious world’ and, in contrast
to most critics and sceptics, understood its value as well as its historical and cultural
roots. He suggested in both Washington and Beijing that it is possible to bring
together the Chinese idea of a ‘harmonious world’ with the concept of China as a
‘responsible stakeholder’, first proposed in 2005 by then-Deputy Secretary of State
Robert Zoellick, arguing that China will be able to contribute to a harmonious
regional and global order if it is positively engaged in international institutions such
as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the World Trade Organization.80 At the same
time, Chinese scholars have also recognized the significant role of Australia in
building a harmonious regional order.81
For Rudd, one of the keys to engaging with China is ‘to encourage China’s active
participation in efforts to maintain, develop and become integrally engaged in global
and regional institutions, structures and norms’.82 Rudd’s proposal for the formation
of an Asia–Pacific Community was an important part of his government’s attempts to
accommodate China’s rise in the region in a way that is as smooth and free from
tension as possible. This proposal aimed to build a framework for multilateral
regional cooperation where security, economic and political issues can all be
discussed in the same institutional context.83
Rudd’s multilateral institutional approach echoes the ASEAN Way that is able to
‘marginalize the use of force’ and socialize China into acting according to norms that
guarantee peace, prosperity and pluralism.84 Yahuda notes that regional multilateral
institutions provide a way for China and its neighbours to mitigate security concerns
by facilitating greater mutual understanding and cooperation in cases where countries
are neither allies nor enemies.85 This approach appears to have had some success.
78. Kevin Rudd, A Conversation with China’s Youth on the Future, (Speech delivered at Peking University, 9
April 2008), available at: http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5857 (accessed 8 March 2010).
79. Kevin Rudd, The Singapore Lecture: Building on ASEAN’s Success: Towards an Asia Pacific Century,
(12 August 2008), available at: http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5643 (accessed 8 March 2010).
80. Rudd, The Australia-US Alliance; Rudd, A Conversation with China’s Youth.
81. Lu Zhang and Huang Ji, ‘Zhongguo Zhoubian Zhanlue Zhong de Aodaliya—“Dazhoubian” Zhanlue Linian
yu Waijiao Mouhua de Xin Tansuo’ [‘Australia in China’s peripheral strategy: the “greater periphery” strategic
concept and new explorations into Chinese diplomatic planning’], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary
International Relations ], no. 2, (2007), pp. 40–46.
82. Rudd, ‘The Australia–US alliance’.
83. Kevin Rudd, It’s Time to Build an Asia Pacific Community (Speech to the Asia Society AustralAsia Centre, 4
June 2008), available at: http://www.pm.gov.au/node/5763 (accessed 8 March 2010).
84. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2003).
85. Michael Yahuda, ‘The evolving Asian order: the accommodation of rising Chinese power’, in David
Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005),
p. 347.
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Johnston finds that the involvement of Chinese policymakers and analysts in the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other related security dialogues has aided
Chinese elites, who have internalized a less unilateral and more cooperative attitude
towards international security.86 According to one Chinese scholar, China has
overcome its early suspicions of ASEAN and the ARF to ‘become a most enthusiastic
advocate of regional cooperation and integration’.87 This enthusiasm does not,
however, extend to Rudd’s proposal for an Asia Pacific Community.88
Despite the expectation that Rudd would broaden the basis for Sino-Australian
relations beyond the economic dimension and bring about a higher level of
cooperation, in reality Rudd’s attempts to build a new institutional architecture for
the region through his Asia Pacific Community proposal stalled, with China’s
Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue stating in April 2009 that ‘conditions aren’t
ripe’ for the initiative to be considered.89
Although an annual Australia–China Strategic Dialogue has now been established
with discussions between the two countries beginning in 2008, Canberra still views
China as a potential threat in terms of national security. The 2009 Australian National
Defence White Paper noted that China ‘needs to do more’ to explain the pace, scope
and structure of its efforts to modernize its military forces in order to avoid generating
concern in its regional neighbours.90 China’s naval build-up was a particular worry
expressed in the document. It claimed that if China’s military modernization were to
lead to a contraction of the US strategic presence in the Asia–Pacific region, then this
would have a negative impact on Australia’s interests.91 Following the release of the
White Paper, prominent Chinese international relations professor Shi Yinhong
claimed that Rudd had ‘turned his face against China’.92
Economic security has become a significant issue in the relationship between
Australia and China. The Foreign Investment Review Board received more
applications for Chinese investment in Australia in the first 16 months of the Rudd
government than it did throughout the entire 12 years of the Howard government.93
The most prominent of these was Chinalco’s bid for a larger stake in Rio Tinto, the
failure of which, and the later arrest in China of senior Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu,
led to tensions between the two countries. In response to the trial of Australian citizen
86. Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 197–198.
87. Jian Zhang, ‘Building a “harmonious world”? Chinese perceptions of regional order and implications for
Australia’, Australian Strategic Policy Institute—Strategic Insights no. 35, (2007).
88. See Baogang He, ”The Awkwardness of Australian Engagement with Asia: The Dilemmas of Australian Idea
of Regionalism, Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12 (2), (2011), pp. 267–285.
89. Lee Spears, ‘Conditions “not ripe” for Asia–Pacific Community, China says’, Bloomberg, (8 April 2009),
available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid¼20601081&sid¼ayq3w9mW2hZw&refer¼australia#
(accessed 22 March 2010). For Chinese ideas of regionalism, see Baogang He, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism:
A Normative Critique,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58(1), (March 2004), pp. 105–125.
90. Department of Defence, Defence White Paper 2009: Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force
2030 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2009), p. 34.
91. Ibid., p. 32.
92. John Garnaut, Michelle Grattan and Anne Davies, ‘Military build-up “risks new Asian arms race”’, The Age,
(4 May 2009), available at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/military-buildup-risks-new-asian-arms-race-200
90503-arew.html (accessed 22 March 2010).
93. Patrick Walters, ‘Planners second-guess resurgent China’, The Australian, (14 March 2009), available at:
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/planners-second-guess-resurgent-china/story-e6frg6z6-111111
9127923 (accessed 22 March 2010).
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Stern Hu in Shanghai, Rudd attempted to invoke the pressure of international public
opinion when he stated publicly that ‘the eyes of the world are focused on the way in
which this trial is conducted and what happens as a result of it’.94
Political issues also clouded the relationship during Rudd’s time in office. In
August 2009, World Uyghur Congress leader, Rebiya Kadeer, visited Australia to
attend the Melbourne Film Festival, where a documentary about her life was being
screened. Occurring only the month after deadly riots in Xinjiang, which China
blamed on Kadeer, the visit led to Chinese anger at, and a series of official protests
over, what was widely seen as Australian support for a terrorist leader. However, the
Chinese government’s attempts to prevent Kadeer’s visit, speeches, and even the film
screening from going ahead, led to Australian resentment at what was seen to be
outside interference by an authoritarian foreign power.95 A few months later Chinese
vice-Premier Li Keqiang visited Australia from 28 October to 1 November 2009,
which was preceded by a major speech on China by Foreign Minister Stephen Smith.
Subsequently a bilateral communique´ improved Sino-Australia relations and cleared
the air over the Rebiya Kadeer visit.
In summary, a mixed picture has emerged. The Rudd government deepened
Australian accommodation policy, for example, by holding an annual Australia–
China Strategic Dialogue since 2008 and the termination in the same year of
Australian involvement in the Quadrilateral Dialogue initiatives. This extends also to
Rudd’s acknowledgment of China’s idea of a harmonious world, his call for the
increasing role played by Beijing in the WTO, and his idea of the Asia Pacific
Community in which China is expected to play a significant role. The conflicts over
Stern Hu and Rebiya Kadeer, which were out of Rudd’s control, originated from
public, media and opposition forces. They should not be seen as something that has
derailed the path to accommodation.
Concluding remarks: the politics of accommodation
The question of to what extent accommodation adjustments are necessary remains
controversial and delicate. While premature accommodation, in the example of
Downer’s statement about Australia’s reluctance to support US intervention on
Taiwan, faced heavy criticism from the US, Australian ‘close, unequivocal, allegiance
to the US may make it difficult to accommodate a new East Asian regional order in
which China looks certain to play an increasingly prominent role’.96 Australian
symbolic and/or substantive accommodation, as evidenced by its recognition of
China’s market status and equal treatment of the Chinese and US heads of state, has
94. Sanghee Liu and John Garnaut, ‘Stern Hu refuses to admit guilt over secrets charge’, The Age, (24 March
2010), available at: http://www.theage.com.au/business/stern-hu-refuses-to-admit-guilt-over-secrets-charges-2010
0324-qw87.html (accessed 29 March 2010).
95. ‘China has no right to censor in Australia’, The Australian (Online Edition), (11 August 2009), available at:
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/opinion/china-has-no-right-to-censor-in-australia/story-e6frg71x-1225
760006119 (accessed 15 February 2010); ‘China complains to Australia about Uighur’s visit’, Sydney Morning
Herald, (30 July 2009), available at: http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-complains-to-australia-about-uighurs-
visit-20090730-e1vw.html (accessed 13 August 2009).
96. Mark Beeson, ‘Australia, the US and East Asia: are close ties with the Bush administration beneficial?’,
Pacific Affairs 79(4), (2006), p. 597.
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deepened economic engagement. Australian accommodation on security dialogue has
eased China’s concerns and thereby reduced potential conflicts. Overall, Australia has
successfully balanced its politics of accommodation: while governments have
remained relatively silent over human rights issues (although Rudd has raised the issue
several times), the Australian public and media have maintained a critical stand.
Australian accommodation of China is not an unprincipled appeasement. It is a
selective one that strongly defends its political system and values of liberal democracy.
Accommodation politics is based on the transformation of great-power politics.
Power transition logics are present in the politics of accommodation. Mutual
accommodation, however, creates a mutually satisfactory order that mitigates the
source of conflict, and undermines the assumptions that power transformation
inevitably leads to war or realignment. Accommodation strategy encourages non-
zero-sum questions, while blurring or undermining friend–enemy assumptions in
traditional alliance politics. Significantly, Australia and some Asian countries have
formed a collective power that wants to avoid a ‘hard choice’ between China and the
US. The behaviour of both China and the US is constrained by the strengthening and
overlapping of political communities and security concerns, and by economic
interdependence. It makes the imposition of a hard choice by two great powers
unreasonable and unacceptable.
Central to this is institutional and regional accommodation that at once both
constrains and enables China. Acharya argues that the engagement strategy favoured
by the ASEAN states is a form of ‘double-binding’ where they consciously try to
‘enmesh both China and the United States in regional interdependence and institutions
so as to induce moderation on the part of China and increase the cost of Chinese use of
force’, while also discouraging unproductive US attempts to contain China.97 While
economic interdependence reduces the potential for conflict with China, regional
institutions socialize China into acting responsibly and accommodate China’s greater
regional role. The intended establishment of the security community proposed by
Rudd exemplifies the key substance of accommodation policy. It aims to enhance the
sense of security community to reduce the security dilemma at play in great-power
politics. A multilateral security arrangement offers security accommodation to China
while seriously constraining its behaviour in the midst of a power transition.
Meanwhile, how a series of mutual accommodation policies between nations might
make something like the East Asian security architecture possible remains to be seen,
as does the evolution of the politics of accommodation. At the moment, the
accommodation of China is in its early infancy and is an unfolding process. The
conceptual refinement of accommodation is further needed in the near future.
97. Acharya, ‘Will Asia’s past be its future?’, pp. 151–153.
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